Abstract. The literature specifies extensive-form games in many styles, and eventually I hope to formally translate games across those styles. Toward that end, this paper defines NCF, the category of node-and-choice forms. The category's objects are extensive forms in essentially any style, and the category's isomorphisms are made to accord with the literature's small handful of ad hoc style equivalences.
1. Introduction
Specification styles
To set the stage, this subsection recalls that there are many styles in which to specify an extensive-form game. All styles must specify [a] nodes, which are variously called "histories", "vertices", or "states"; and [b] choices, which are variously called "actions", "alternatives", "labels", or "programs". The following paragraphs arrange the styles into five broad groups according to how the styles specify nodes and choices.
[1] Some styles specify nodes and choices abstractly without restriction. Classic examples from economics include the style of Kuhn 1953 and the style of Selten 1975 . Examples from computer science and/or logic include the style of Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2009, page 125 ; the "labeled transition system" style 1 in Blackburn, de Rijke, and Venema 2002, page 3; and the "epistemic process graph" style of van Benthem 2014, page 70. A final example is the "node-and-choice" style of this paper (see Figure 1.1) . Because each of these styles specifies nodes and choices abstractly without restriction, each can be roughly understood to encompass all other styles as special cases. A node-and-choice form (later called an "NCF form").
Player P 3 selects choice e or choice f without knowing whether she is at node 3 or node 4.
[2] Other styles specify nodes as sequences of choices. A popular example in economics is the style of Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, page 200 . Examples from logic include the "logical game" style of Hodges 2013, Section 2, and the "epistemic forest model" style of van Benthem 2014, page 130. Examples from computer science include the "protocol" style of Parikh and Ramanujam 1985 , the "history-based (b) A choice-set form (later called a "CsetF form"). These special kinds of node-and-choice forms are developed further in this paper.
multi-agent structure" style of Pacuit 2007 , and the "sequence-form representation" style of Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2009, page 129 . A final example is the "choice-sequence" style of this paper (see Figure 1.2(a) ).
[3] Other styles specify nodes as sets of choices. Examples include the "choice-set" style of Streufert 2019 (henceforth "SE") , and also the "choice-set" style of this paper (see Figure 1 .2 (b) ). There are still other possibilities.
[4] Some styles specify choices as sets of nodes, as in the "simple" style of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016, Section 6.3 (see Figure 1.3(a) ).
[5] Other styles express both nodes and choices as sets of outcomes, as in the style of von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Section 10. and the style of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016, Section 6.2 (see Figure 1.3(b) ). Possibilities [1] - [5] are arranged in a spectrum by SE (Streufert 2019) , Figure 2 . Further, SE Section 7 explains how each possibility has its own advantages and disadvantages. In (a) , choices are node sets. In (b) , both nodes and choices are outcome sets. These special kinds of node-and-choice forms are not developed further in this paper.
General motivation
It is difficult to formally compare the different styles. Indeed, the first such results have only recently appeared in Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016 Section 6.3, in Kline and Luckraz 2016, and in SE (whose Figure 2 provides an overview of all these results). These contributions show, by ad hoc constructions, that the five styles in the above figures are of roughly equal generality. To be somewhat more precise, these papers argue that one style is at least as general as another style, by showing that each game 3 in the first style can be reasonably mapped to a game in the second style. Then two styles are regarded as equivalent if such an argument can be made in both directions. Notice that each such argument hinges upon an ad hoc mapping linking games in one style to games in another style. Lacking is a way to compare styles that is based on a systematic way of comparing games. I hope to provide that systematization in a fashion that is compatible with the prior style equivalences.
Further, I have a larger agenda in mind. Suppose that two styles have been compared and found to be equivalent. Then I hope to do more than merely translate each game in one style to an equivalent game in the other style. I hope to translate properties, defined for games, from one style to the other. I hope to translate equilibrium concepts from one style to the other. And ultimately, I hope to translate theorems from one style to the other. In other words, I hope to formally translate game theory from one style to another.
Such an overarching theory promises to deliver large conceptual benefits. Foremost among the benefits is the synthesis of results and questions from the many disciplines and subdisciplines which are currently studying some version of game theory. There is much to be gained because there is so much diversity. Further, I believe that, fundamentally, we should make the focus of our thinking an equivalence class of games, rather than an individual game. Such an equivalence class will typically contain games in many styles. If we can easily translate across those styles, the essence of the equivalence class can emerge.
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Formal translation is a daunting task. Fortunately, category theory promises to be a powerful and natural tool. In order to gain access to this tool, my intermediaterange objective has been to construct a category [a] whose objects are extensiveform games in any style, and [b] whose isomorphisms accord with the handful of style equivalences already in the literature. My first step was Streufert 2018 (henceforth "SP") . That paper defined NCP, which is the category of node-andchoice "preforms", where a preform is a rooted tree with choices and information sets. My second step is the present paper. Here I define NCF, which is the category of node-and-choice "forms", where a form augments a preform with players. Later, a third paper will augment NCF forms with preferences in order to define extensiveform games.
Elsewhere there is little categorical work on game theory. Lapitsky 1999 and Jiménez 2014 define categories of simultaneous-move games. Machover and Terrington 2014 defines a category of simple voting games. Vannucci 2007 defines categories of various games, but in its category of extensive-form games, every morphism merely maps a game to itself. Finally, Hedges 2017 develops morphisms for open games, which resemble extensive-form games but which do not appear to accommodate players with different information. 
Categorical Investments
As explained two paragraphs ago, this paper constructs a category of forms [a] whose objects are forms in any style, and [b] whose isomorphisms accord with the style equivalences already in the literature. Goals [a] and [b] are discussed in the next two paragraphs. Section 2 introduces NCF, which is the category of node-and-choice forms, in which both nodes and choices are specified abstractly without restriction. Thereby goal [a] is achieved. Further, one special kind of node-and-choice form is a choicesequence form, in which nodes are choice-sequences. Correspondingly, Section 3 introduces CsqF, which is the full NCF subcategory for choice-sequence forms. Similarly, another special kind of node-and-choice form is a choice-set form, in 1. Introduction which nodes are choice-sets. Correspondingly, Section 4 introduces CsetF, which is the full NCF subcategory for choice-set forms. Finally, consider again the five styles in Section 1.1. NCF itself corresponds to style [1] , CsqF corresponds to style [2] , and CsetF corresponds to style [3] . Left for future research are style [4] with its node-set choices, and style [5] with its outcome-set nodes and outcome-set choices. These two additional styles will correspond to two additional subcategories of NCF, as suggested in Section 5.2's discussion of future research.
To achieve goal [b] , Section 2 defines NCF's morphisms in such a way that the category's isomorphisms accord with the style equivalences in the literature. Since this paper does not build subcategories for the node-set and outcome-set styles, only two of the literature's style equivalences remain: [i] Kline and Luckraz 2016 Theorems 1 and 2, which are essentially an equivalence between node-and-choice forms and choice-sequence forms, and [ii] SE Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, which are essentially an equivalence between (no-absentminded) choice-sequence forms and choice-set forms. As discussed earlier, each of these two equivalences is a matching pair of results, in which each result states that each form in one style can be reasonably mapped to a form in the other style. Section 3.2 proposes to strengthen each such result by requiring that each form in one style is NCF isomorphic to a form in the other style. This new kind of result is called an "isomorphic enclosure", and a matching pair of isomorphic enclosures is called an "isomorphic equivalence". Equivalence [i] accords with Corollary 3.3 (b) , which states that NCF and CsqF are isomorphically equivalent. Similarly, equivalence [ii] accords with Corollary 4.3 (b) , which states that CsqFã and CsetF are isomorphically equivalent. The paragraphs after these two corollaries provide historical context, more details, and more senses in which the two corollaries accord with literature's equivalences [i] and [ii] .
Other results show that NCF is pleasant in other ways. Theorem 2.3 shows that NCF is a well-defined category. Theorem 2.4 shows that an NCF isomorphism can be characterized by bijections for nodes, choices, and players. Theorem 2.7 shows that there is a forgetful functor from NCF to NCP, which is SP's category of node-and-choice preforms. In addition, various results in Sections 2.1-2.3 show that the category interacts naturally with game-theoretic concepts like the assignment of information sets to players. Also, Section 2.4 shows that the properties of no-absentmindedness and perfect-information are invariant to NCF isomorphisms. Finally, the paragraph after Corollary 3.5 shows how the negation of isomorphic enclosure formalizes the notion that a property is truly "restrictive" and "substantial" as opposed to merely "notational".
1.4. Categorical Dividends Section 1.3 above argues that NCF systematizes prior style equivalences and that it is a pleasant category in a variety of other ways. Also, Sections 1.2 and 5.2 argue that NCF promises to be of practical importance in the larger agenda of translating game theory across styles. Further, the following three paragraphs identify three practical ways that NCF directly contributes to game theory.
First, isomorphic invariance is a natural and powerful concept. For example, two elementary propositions in Section 3.3 use isomorphic invariance to find [1] general circumstances in which one subcategory is strictly isomorphically enclosed by another and [2] general circumstances in which an isomorphic enclosure can be restricted to smaller subcategories. The latter proposition is used by Corollary 3.7 (b) to easily construct an isomorphic enclosure for the proof highlighted in the next paragraph. Further, both propositions are used by Section 4.3 to easily derive new results about perfect-information.
Second, isomorphic enclosures can be composed (note 19). Such compositions can make it much easier to derive other isomorphic enclosures. For example, the proof of Corollary 4.3(b)'s reverse direction is just six lines long, and the third paragraph following the corollary's proof explains how this simple argument replaces six difficult pages in SE's proof of its Theorem 3.2. Thus the isomorphic equivalence of Corollary 4.3(b) is much easier to prove than the corresponding ad hoc equivalence of SE Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 (this was called equivalence [ii] in Section 1.3).
Third, isomorphic enclosures have consequences for form derivatives, and Section 5.1 deduces them simultaneously for all isomorphic enclosures. More specifically, each isomorphic enclosure is defined via isomorphisms, and Proposition 2.6 implies that each such isomorphism has consequences not only for form components (such as nodes, choices, and players) but also for form derivatives (such as the precedence relation among nodes, and each player's collection of information sets). In contrast, the literature's ad hoc style equivalences concern only form components.
Organization
Section 2 develops NCF, the category of node-and-choice forms. Less generally, Section 3 develops the subcategory CsqF for choice-sequence forms, and Section 4 develops the subcategory CsetF for choice-set forms. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 use the context of CsqF to introduce the general concept of isomorphic enclosure, and to introduce general propositions about isomorphic invariance. Further, Section 5.1 uses parts of Sections 3 and 4 to illustrate some general consequences of isomorphic enclosure. Finally, Section 5.2 discusses future research.
Although many proofs appear within the text, twelve lengthy proofs and their associated lemmas are relegated to the appendices. Appendix A concerns NCF, Appendix B concerns CsqF, and Appendix C concerns CsetF.
The Category of Node-and-Choice Forms

Objects
Let T be a set of elements t called nodes. As in SP Section 2.1 (where "SP" abbreviates Streufert 2018), a pair (T, p) is a functioned tree iff there are
6 Call p the (immediate) predecessor function. A functioned tree (uniquely) determines many entities beyond T and p. First, it determines its root node t o and its set X of decision nodes. Second, it determines its stage function k:T →N 0 by [a] 
. Relatedly, it determines its weak precedence relation on
. Finally, it determines the set Z of maximal chains in (T, ). This can be split into the set Z ft of finite maximal 6 I adopt the conventions that N 0 is {0, 1, 2, ...}, that N 1 is {1, 2, ...}, and that, for any function f , f 0 is the identity function.
chains and the (possibly empty) set Z inft of infinite maximal chains. These derived entities and their basic properties are developed in SP Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
Let C be a set of elements c called choices. A triple Π = (T, C, ⊗) is a (nodeand-choice) preform (SP Section 3.1) iff [P1] there is a correspondence 7 F :T C and a t o ∈T such that ⊗ is a bijection from
Call ⊗ the node-and-choice operator, 10 and let t⊗c denote its value at (t, c) ∈ F gr . Call F the feasibility correspondence, call t o the root node, call p the immediatepredecessor function, and call H the collection of information sets. In addition, let X equal F −1 (C) (inconsequentially, SP uses F −1 (C) rather than X). Call X the decision-node set.
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A node-and-choice preform Π (uniquely) determines many entities. First, it determines its components T , C, and ⊗. Second, it determines its F , t o , p, H, and X, as discussed in the previous paragraph. Third, [P2] determines the functioned tree (T, p), which in turn determines k, ≺, , Z ft , and Z inft , as discussed in the second-previous paragraph. Finally, define the preform's previous-choice function q:T {t o }→C by q gr = {(t , c)∈T ×C|(∃t∈T )(t, c, t )∈⊗ gr }. All these entities and their basic properties are developed in SP Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Among the basic properties is the convenient fact that (p, q) = ⊗ −1 . Further properties appear in SP Lemmas A.1, C.1, and C.2, and also in Lemma A.1 here.
7 To be clear, let F :T C mean that F is a correspondence from T to C, which means that (∀t∈T ) F (t) ⊆ C. Also, for c ∈ C, let F −1 (c) = {t∈T |c∈F (t)}. Also, let F −1 (C) = ∪ c∈C F −1 (c) .
8 In contrast to SP, the present paper notationally distinguishes between a correspondence and its graph, between a function and its graph, and between a binary relation and its graph. Thus [P1] distinguishes between the correspondence F and its graph F gr ⊆ T ×C. Also, [P2] distinguishes between the function p and its graph p gr ⊆ T ×T , and between the function ⊗ and its graph ⊗ gr ⊆ T ×C×T . Also, for example, Proposition 2.2(o) distinguishes between a relation ≺ and its graph ≺ gr ⊆ T ×T .
9 SP Lemma C.1 (a) shows that [P1] implies the well-definition and surjectivity of p. 10 A preform's node-and-choice operator ⊗ can be regarded as a special kind of labeled transition system (e.g. Blackburn, de Rijke, and Venema 2001, page 3; van Benthem 2014, page 36) . More precisely, a labeled transition system is a pair (S, (Ra) a∈A ) consisting of [1] a set S of states s and [2] a collection of binary relations Ra, each defined over S, which is indexed by a set A of labels a. A preform's node-and-choice operator ⊗ ⊆ T ×C×T determines a labeled transition system (S, (Ra) a∈A ) by setting S = T , setting A = C, and setting each Rc = {(t, t )|(t, c, t )∈⊗}. Conversely, a labeled transition system (S, (Ra) a∈A ) determines a node-and-choice operator ⊗ ⊆ T ×C×T by setting T = S, setting C = A, and setting ⊗ = {(s, a, s )|(s, s )∈Ra}. [P2] restricts this construction by requiring that {(s , s)|(∃a∈A)(s, s )∈Ra} is a functioned tree, and [P3] further restricts the construction by requiring that the labels a ∈ A serve to specify information sets (these two restrictions concern [1] and [3] in note 2).
11 SP Lemma C.1(b, c) implies that a preform's t o and X coincide with the underlying tree's t o and X. Hence the symbols t o and X are unambiguous.
Let I be a set of elements i called players.
Each C i is the set of choices that are assigned to player i. The definitions in this paragraph are new to this paper (and an earlier version, Streufert 2016).
A node-and-choice form Φ (uniquely) determines many entities. First, it determines its components I, T , (C i ) i∈I , and ⊗. Second, [F1] determines C and the preform (T, C, ⊗), which in turn determines F , t o , p, q, H, X, k, ≺, , Z ft , and Z inft , as discussed in the second-previous paragraph. In addition, define (X i ) i∈I at each i by X i = ∪ c∈Ci F −1 (c) . X i is the set of decision nodes that are assigned to player i. Further, define (H i 
H i is the collection of information sets that are assigned to player i.
is a node-and-choice form with its X, H, (X i ) i∈I , and (H i ) i∈I . Then the following hold. (a) ∪ i∈I X i = X and (∀i∈I, j∈I {i})
Here are two minor remarks. [1] A preform can be understood as a one-player form. Specifically, (T, C, ⊗) is a preform iff ({1}, T, (C), ⊗) is a form, where (C i ) i = (C) is taken to mean C 1 = C. [2] A player i in a form is said to be vacuous iff C i = ∅. A vacuous player i necessarily has X i = ∅ and H i = ∅. Vacuous players can be convenient. For example, one can posit the existence of a chance player, and yet create a game without chance nodes by letting the chance player be vacuous.
Morphisms
A (node-and-choice) preform morphism (SP Section 3.3) is a quadruple α = [Π, Π , τ, δ] such that Π = (T, C, ⊗) and Π = (T , C , ⊗ ) are preforms,
δ:C→C , and
SP Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 give two characterizations of preform morphisms which feel more category-theoretic. A (node-and-choice) form morphism is a quintuple
ι:I→I , and
The first paragraph of Proposition 2.2 rearranges the definition of a morphism. Meanwhile, the second and third paragraphs concern the many derivatives which can be constructed, via Section 2.1, from the source and target forms. Parts (k) and 
Finally, derive k, ≺, , Z ft , and Z inft from (T, p). Also, derive k , ≺ , , Z ft , and Z inft from (T , p ). Then the following hold.
The category NCF
This paragraph and Theorem 2.3 define the category NCF, which is called the category of node-and-choice forms. Let an object be a (node-and-choice) form Φ = (I, T, (C i ) i∈I , ⊗). Let an arrow be a (node-and-choice) form morphism β = [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] . Let source, target, identity, and composition be
, and
where id I , id T , and id ∪ i∈I Ci are identities in Set. 
is a morphism. Let Π be the preform in Φ, and let Π be the preform in Φ . Then [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] is an isomorphism iff [1] [Π, Π , τ, δ] is a preform isomorphism and [2] ι is a bijection. (Proof here.)
Proof. Note [Π, Π , τ, δ] is a preform morphism by [FM1] for [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] . Thus SP Theorem 3.7 (a) shows that [1] is equivalent to the bijectivity of τ and δ. Therefore [1] and [2] together are equivalent to the bijectivity of ι, τ , and δ. By Theorem 2.4(a), this is equivalent to [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] being an isomorphism.
2 Proposition 2.6 organizes some 12 of the consequences of a form isomorphism. The proposition's first paragraph concerns form components, while the second and third paragraphs concern form derivatives. Consequences (a)- (c) repeat the forward direction of Theorem 2.4(a). Consequences (d), (k), and (m) are new, while the remainder are obtained by combining the forward direction of Corollary 2.5 with SP results about preforms and trees. The entire proposition is comparable to Proposition 2.2 for morphisms, and Section 5.1 will discuss how the proposition contributes directly to game theory.
To address a minor technical issue, note that many of the proposition's consequences are formulated by restricting functions. In each case, the codomain of the restriction is defined so that the restriction is surjective. Some other minor technical issues are discussed in notes 8, 13, and 14.
13,14
12 The proposition's list of consequences is far from exhaustive. For example, in the notation of the proposition's second paragraph, Lemma A.2(b) deduces that (∀c∈C) τ (F −1 (c)) = (F ) −1 (δ(c)).
13 To be clear, parts (d), (k), and (m) do hold when there is a vacuous player i. In this case, C i is empty, and thus, and H ι(i) are all empty as well.
14 In parts (l), (m), (q), and (r), τ is understood to be the function
14 (Proof A.9.)
As already noted, the definition of a form incorporates a preform, and the definition of a form morphism incorporates a preform morphism. Correspondingly, Theorem 2.7 shows there is a "forgetful" functor P from NCF to NCP. Incidentally, SP Theorem 3.9 shows there is a similar functor F from NCP to Tree. Hence F•P is a functor from NCF to Tree. Theorem 2.7. Define P from NCF to NCP by
Then P is a well-defined functor. (Proof A.10.)
No-absentmindedness and perfect-information
Consider an arbitrary category Z, and a property which is defined for the objects of Z. The property is said to be isomorphically invariant iff, for each object, the object satisfies the property iff all of its isomorphs satisfy the property. This section explores two isomorphically invariant properties: [1] no-absentmindedness and [2] perfect-information. Both properties restrict information sets.
No-absentmindedness is a standard property which is widely regarded as being very weak (see, for example, Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016 Section 4.2.3). To define this property in NCP, consider an NCP preform with its ≺ and H. Then the preform is said to have no-absentmindedness iff (/ ∃H∈H,
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Further, consider an NCF form with its preform. Then the form is said to have no-absentmindedness iff its preform has no-absentmindedness.
is an NCP morphism and Π has noabsentmindedness, then Π has no-absentmindedness.
is an NCF morphism and Φ has no-absentmindedness, then Φ has no-absentmindedness. (b) No-absentmindedness is isomorphically invariant in NCF. (Proof A.11.) Let NCPã be the full subcategory of NCP whose objects are preforms with no-absentmindedness. (I am endeavouring to use subscripts for isomorphically invariant properties.) Similarly, let NCFã be the full subcategory of NCF whose objects are forms with no-absentmindedness. No-absentmindedness will appear again in Section 3.3. 15 Piccione and Rubinstein 1997 Figure 1 provides an example of absentmindedness. A corresponding NCP preform Π = (T, C, ⊗) can be defined by T = {{}, (a), (b) , (a, a) , (a, b) }, C = {a, b}, and ⊗ = {({}, a, (a)), ({}, b, (b) 
can be defined by setting T and ⊗ as above, setting I = {1}, and setting C 1 = {a, b}. The existence of this example is used in the proof of Corollary 3.5.
Perfect-information is another standard property. It is restrictive, and at the same time, there are many interesting games which satisfy it (see, for example, Osborne and Rubinstein 1994 Part II) . As in SP Section 3.5, an NCP preform, with its collection H of information sets H, is said to have perfect-information iff (∀H∈H) |H| = 1. Perfect-information is strictly stronger than no-absentmindedness.
16,17
Further, an NCF form is said to have perfect-information iff the form's preform has perfect-information. (In spite of Proposition 2.9, the existence of a morphism does not lead to any logical relationship between the source's perfect-information and the target's perfect-information.)
Let NCP p be the full subcategory of NCP whose objects are preforms with perfect-information. (The subscriptã p would be equivalent to the subscript p , because no-absentmindedness is implied by perfect-information, as shown in note 16.) Further, let NCF p be the full subcategory of NCF whose objects are forms with perfect-information. Perfect-information will appear again in Section 4.3.
The Subcategory of Choice-Sequence Forms
Objects
Let a (finite) sequence be a function from {1, 2, ... m} for some nonnegative integer m (to be clear, the empty sequence 18 with empty domain is admitted by m = 0). I will regard a sequence as a set of ordered pairs. For example, t
} is a sequence with domain {1, 2, 3}. An alternative notation for the same entity is t * = (g, f, f). Yet another is t * = (t * n ) 3 n=1 where t * 1 = g and t * 2 = t * 3 = f. Let the length of a sequence t be |t|. For instance, the length of the example sequence is |t
, which is consistent with the observation that (2, f) = (3, f). Note that the length of the empty sequence {} is |{}| = 0. Next, let the range of a sequence t be R(t) = { t n | n∈{1, 2, ... |t|} }. For instance, the range of the example sequence is R(t
Note that the range of the empty sequence {} is R({}) = ∅.
Let the concatenation t⊕s of two sequences t and s be {(1,
Thus the concatenation of a sequence t = (t 1 , t 2 , ... t |t| ) with a one-element sequence (c) is t⊕(c) = (t 1 , t 2 , ... t |t| , c). Next, for any sequence 16 To see that perfect-information implies no-absentmindedness, assume no-absentmindedness is violated. Then there is H ∈ H, t A ∈ H, and t B ∈ H such that t A ≺ t B . Thus t A = t B . So |H| > 1 and perfect-information is violated.
17 A simple example of a form which satisfies no-absentmindedness but not perfect-information is a form corresponding to a two-person simultaneous-move game. Specifically, define the
can be defined by setting T and ⊗ as above, setting I = {1, 2}, and setting C 1 = {a, b} and C 2 = {c, d}. The existence of this example is used in the proof of Corollary 4.4. [A slightly more complicated example with the same combination of properties can be obtained from any of the five figures in Section 1. 1.] 18 The empty sequence is the empty set. Further, {} and ∅ are alternative notations for the empty set. I use {} for a root node, and use ∅ for all other purposes.
t and any ∈ {0, 1, 2, ... |t|}, let 1 t denote the initial segment (t 1 , t 2 , ... t ). Thus for any sequence t,
T is a collection of (finite) sequences which contains {},
Let CsqP be the full subcategory of NCP whose objects are choice-sequence preforms. Proposition 3.1 lists some of the special properties of CsqP preforms. Incidentally, property (h) and assumption [Csq1] together imply that each node in a CsqP preform is actually a choice sequence, as the terminology suggests.
1.) Finally, let a choice-sequence NCF form be an NCF form whose preform is a CsqP preform. Then let CsqF be the full subcategory of NCF whose objects are choice-sequence NCF forms.
Isomorphic Enclosure
Consider two full subcategories A and B of some overarching category Z. Say that A is isomorphically enclosed in B (in symbols, A → . B) iff every object of A is isomorphic to an object of B. Note that A → . B concerns not only the subcategories A and B but also, implicitly, the overarching category Z within which isomorphisms are defined. Further note that isomorphic enclosures can be composed in the sense that A → . B and B → . C imply A → . C.
19 Finally, let A ↔ . B mean that both A → . B and A ← . B hold. Call ↔ . isomorphic equivalence. Isomorphic equivalence implies the standard categorical concept of equivalence in MacLane 1998 page 18.
is an NCP preform with its p, q, and
, and define⊗ by surjectivity and⊗
and⊗ as
19 To prove composability, recall A → . B means that [a] each A form is isomorphic to a B form.
Similarly, B → . C means that [b] each B form is isomorphic to a C form. [a] and [b] imply that each A form is isomorphic to a C form, and this is what is meant by A → . C. in part (a) 
Proof. (a) . NCP → . CsqP by Theorem 3.2 (a) . Conversely, each CsqP preform is an NCP preform by definition. (b) . This is very similar to (a) . Change "preform" to "form", P to F, and (a) to (b) . 2 This equivalence has a long history. In the more distant past, it was informally understood that game trees could be specified in terms of either Kline and Luckraz 2016 21 (henceforth "KL16") develop this equivalence by a pair of theorems. In recognition of the above authors, they call style-[i] forms "KS forms" and call style-[ii] forms "OR forms". Then, one of their theorems (their Theorem 2) shows that a KS form can be derived from each OR form, while the other theorem (their Theorem 1) shows that each KS form can be mapped to an OR form.
22 These two theorems are depicted by the two arrows in Figure 3 .1 (a) . The arrows are dashed to convey that the equivalence is ad hoc. how to construct isomorphisms in NCP and NCF from bijections for nodes, choices, and players. These lemmas appear to have application beyond this paper. 21 The terms "choice", "action", and "alternative" are fundamentally synonymous. However, the literature tends to use "choice" when it is assumed that information sets do not share alternatives, and conversely, to use "action" when the assumption is relaxed. The assumption itself is insubstantial in the sense that one can always introduce more alternatives until each information set has its own alternatives (see SE Section 5.2, first paragraph, for more discussion). This paper makes the assumption for notational convenience, and correspondingly, uses "choice" (see SP Proposition 3.2(16b) and the paragraphs beforehand). In contrast, KL16 relaxes the assumption and uses "action". 22 SE Theorems 3.2 and 3.1 adapt and slightly extend KL16 Theorems 2 and 1.
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an NCF form is isomorphic to each CsqF form, while the other half (Theorem 3.2) shows that each NCF form is isomorphic to a CsqF form. Thus the corollary's isomorphic equivalence strengthens the KL16 equivalence by introducing isomorphisms.
There are further senses in which the corollary's isomorphic equivalence accords with the KL16 equivalence. In the backward direction, KL16 Theorem 2 is appealing because the nodes in the constructed KS form are identical to the sequences in the given OR form. This is possible because KS nodes admit OR sequences as special cases. Nonetheless KL16 Theorem 2 is nontrivial because KS forms do not admit OR forms as special cases. Here the analogous result is cleaner: NCF forms have been defined so that NCF forms admit CsqF forms as special cases. In the forward direction, KL16 Theorem 1 is made appealing by KL16 Lemma 2, which shows that there is a bijection α from the "vertex histories" in the given KS form to the nodes in the constructed OR form. That bijection is closely related to Theorem 3.2's bijectionτ , which maps from the nodes of the given NCF form to the nodes in the constructed CsqF form.
More about No-absentmindedness
3.3.1. Proposition 3.4 describes a general situation in which one subcategory strictly isomorphically encloses another. In the proposition, w and s are two properties defined for the objects of Z. Further, w ⇐ ⇒ s means that w is strictly weaker than s. In other words, w ⇐ ⇒ s means that [a] each object of Z satisfies w if it satisfies s, and [b] there is an object of Z that satisfies w but not s. Corollary 3.5 applies Proposition 3.4 to the nonvacuous property of no-absentmindedness.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose w and s are properties defined for the objects of Z, and that s is isomorphically invariant. Let Z w be the full subcategory of Z whose objects satisfy w, and let Z s be the full subcategory of Z whose objects satisfy s.
Proof. Suppose w ⇐ ⇒ s. To see Z w ← . Z s , take an object of Z s . Since w ⇐ s, the object is also an object of Z w . Thus (trivially) the object is isomorphic to an object of Z w . To see Z w → . Z s , note the assumption w ⇐ ⇒ s implies that there is an object of Z that satisfies w and violates s. Thus there is an object of Z w that violates s. Thus since s is isomorphically invariant, this object does not have an isomorph that satisfies s. Thus the object does not have an isomorph in Z s .
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Proof. (a) . Consider Proposition 3.4 at Z equal to NCP, when w is the vacuous property satisfied by all objects of NCP, and s is the property of noabsentmindedness. No-absentmindedness is invariant by Proposition 2.8(a). Further the vacuous property is strictly weaker than no-absentmindedness because there exists an absentminded preform (recall note 15). Thus Proposition 3.4 implies that NCP w = NCP strictly isomorphically encloses NCP s = NCPã. (b) . This is very similar to (a) . Change "preform" to "form", P to F, and (a) to (b) . 2 To better interpret Corollary 3.5, recall Theorem 3.2(b) which states NCF → . CsqF. Formally, this means each NCF form is isomorphic to a CsqF form. This can be interpreted to mean that the property of having choice-sequence nodes is not "restrictive". In contrast, Corollary 3.5(b) implies NCF → . NCFã. Formally, this means there is at least one NCF form (such as the one in note 15) that is not isomorphic to an NCFã form. This can be interpreted to mean that the property of no-absentmindedness is "restrictive". Informally, the first result states that choice-sequence-ness is "purely notational". In contrast, the second result states that no-absentmindedness is "substantial", "significant", and "real", and that it "limits the range of decision processes and social interactions that can be modelled". The categorical concept of isomorphic enclosure (→ . ) serves to formalize and to standardize these important terms. Note that both an isomorphic enclosure, and the negation of an isomorphic enclosure, are meaningful.
3.3.2. Next, Proposition 3.6 shows that an isomorphic enclosure can be restricted by any isomorphically invariant property. Corollary 3.7 uses this result to restrict Corollary 3.3 by no-absentmindedness. Corollary 3.7 will in turn be used in the remarkably quick proof of Corollary 4.3.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose that A and B are full subcategories of Z, and that w is an isomorphically invariant property defined for the objects of Z. Let A w be the full subcategory of A whose objects satisfy w, and let B w be the full subcategory of B whose objects satisfy w.
To show A w → . B w , take an object of A w . Then [1] the object is an object of A and [2] the object satisfies w. By [1] and A → . B, the object has an isomorph in B. By [2] and the isomorphic invariance of w, the isomorph satisfies w. The conclusions of the previous two sentences imply that the isomorph is in B w .
Proof. (a) follows from Corollary 3.3(a), Proposition 3.6, and Proposition 2.8(a). (b) is very similar to (a) . Just change (a) to (b) .
NCFã ←→ . 3.3.3. Finally, Corollary 3.8 could be proved by mimicking the proof of Corollary 3.5, in which case Proposition 3.4 would be employed once for part (a) at Z = CsqP, and again for part (b) at Z = CsqF. Instead, Corollary 3.8 is proved by composing isomorphic enclosures (note 19), and the proof of the corollary's part (b) is illustrated by Figure 3 .2. Both proof techniques are straightforward, and a more interesting example of composition will soon appear in the proof of Corollary 4.3.
Proof. (a) . This is very similar to (b) . Change F to P, and (b) to (a) . (b) . To see CsqF ← . CsqFã, note that CsqF ← . NCF ← . NCFã ← . CsqFã by, respectively, Corollary 3.3(b), Corollary 3.5 (b) , and Corollary 3.7 (b) . To see CsqF → . CsqFã, suppose it were. Then NCF → . CsqF → . CsqFã → . NCFã by, respectively, Corollary 3.3 (b) , the supposition of the previous sentence, and Corollary 3.7 (b) . This contradicts Corollary 3.5 (b) , which states that NCF → . NCFã. 2
The Subcategory of Choice-Set Forms
Objects
Let a choice-set NCP preform be an NCP preform (T, C, ⊗) such that
T is a collection of finite sets which contains {} and
Then let CsetP be the full subcategory of NCP whose objects are choice-set NCP preforms. Proposition 4.1 lists some of the special properties of CsetP preforms.
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Incidentally, property (f) and assumption [Cset1] together imply that each node in a CsetP preform is actually a choice set, in accord with the terminology. More significantly, property (g) shows that every CsetP preform has no-absentmindedness. In this sense the combination of [Cset1] and [Cset2] is restrictive.
Finally, let a choice-set NCF form be an NCF form whose preform is a CsetP preform. Then let CsetF be the full subcategory of NCF whose objects are choiceset NCF forms. 
Isomorphic Enclosure
Theorem 4.2. (a) CsqPã → . CsetP. In particular, supposeΠ = (T,C,⊗) is a CsqPã preform. Define T = R(T ), and define ⊗ by surjectivity and
Proof. (a) . This is very similar to (b) . Change "form" to "preform", F to P, (b) to (a) , and the last phrase to "because it has no-absentmindedness by Proposition 4.1(g)".
(b). Theorem 4.2 (b) shows CsqFã → . CsetF. Thus it remains to show CsqFã ← . CsetF. Since isomorphic enclosures can be composed, it suffices to show [1] CsetF → . NCFã and [2] NCFã → . CsqFã. [2] is the forward direction of Corollary 3.7 (b) . [1] holds simply because any CsetF form is a NCFã form. To see this, take a CsetF form. It is an NCF form by construction. It has no-absentmindedness because its preform has no-absentmindedness by Proposition 4.1(g).
ORā SEcs NCF ←→ .
C3.3(b)
CsqF ← . → .
C3.5(b)
← . → .
C3.8(b)
NCFã ←→ .
C3.7(b)
CsqFã CsetF Corollary 4.3(b) is analogous to an ad hoc style equivalence in SE. There, a pair of results argues that no-absentminded OR forms ("ORā forms" in this subsection) are equivalent to SE-choice-set forms ("SEcs forms" in this subsection). One of the results (SE Theorem 3.2) shows that an ORā form can be reasonably derived from each SEcs form, and the other result (SE Theorem 3.1) shows that each ORā form can be reasonably mapped to an SEcs form. These two theorems are depicted by the two dashed arrows in Figure 4.1(a) .
Corollary 4.3(b) strengthens this equivalence. CsqFã forms are like ORā forms in that both specify nodes as choice-sequences, and CsetF forms are like SEcs forms in that both specify nodes as choice-sets. Then, Corollary 4.3(b)'s isomorphic equivalence is a matching pair of results: one half (labelled "easy" in Figure 4 .1 (b) ) shows that a CsqFã form is isomorphic to each CsetF form, while the other half (Theorem 4.2) shows that each CsqFã form is isomorphic to a CsetF form. Thus Corollary 4.3(b) strengthens the SE equivalence by introducing isomorphisms.
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Corollary 4.3(b)'s proof highlights how useful it is to compose isomorphic enclosures. In particular, consider the reverse direction of Corollary 4.3 (b) , which is CsqFã ← . CsetF in Figure 4 .1 (b) , and compare it with SE Theorem 3.2, which is ORā SEcs in Figure 4 .1 (a) . The lemmas and proof for SE Theorem 3.2 span six difficult pages. In contrast, the reverse direction of Corollary 4.3(b) is proved in six lines by composing an easily-proved enclosure (CsetF → . NCFã in part [1] of proof) with a previously-proved enclosure (NCFã → . CsqFã from the forward half of Corollary 3.7(b)). Figure 4 .1 (b) shows this composition as the curved arrow followed by the forward direction of Corollary 3.7(b).
More about Perfect-Information
Corollaries 4.4 and 4.5 are additional applications of Section 3.3's general propositions using isomorphic invariance.
Proof. (a) . Consider Proposition 3.4 at Z equal to NCP, when w is the property of no-absentmindednessã, and s is the property of perfect-information p. Perfect-information is isomorphically invariant by Proposition 2.9(a). Further noabsentmindedness is strictly weaker than perfect-information by notes 16 and 17. Thus Proposition 3.4 implies that NCPã strictly isomorphically encloses NCP p . (b) . This is very similar to (a) . Change P to F, and (a) to (b) .
Proof. (a) . Corollary 3.7(a) and Corollary 4.3(a) imply NCPã ↔ . CsqPã ↔ . CsetP. Thus, Propositions 3.6 and 2.9(a) imply that NCPã p ↔ . CsqPã p ↔ . CsetP p , where NCPã p is the full subcategory of NCP consisting of those objects that satisfy both no-absentmindedness and perfect-information, and where similarly CsqPã p is the full subcategory of CsqP consisting of those objects that satisfy both no-absentmindedness and perfect-information. Since no-absentmindedness is weaker than perfect-information (note 16), NCPã p = NCP p and CsqPã p = CsqP p . (b) . This is very similar to (a) . Change P to F, and (a) to (b) . 2 Incidentally, since isomorphic equivalence implies categorical equivalence, Corollary 4.5(a) implies NCP p , CsqP p , and CsetP p are categorically equivalent. Further, SP Theorem 3.13 and Corollary 3.14 show that NCP p , Tree, and Grph ca are categorically equivalent, where Tree is the category of functioned trees which SP uses in its development of NCP, and where Grph ca is the full subcategory of Grph whose objects are converging arborescences. Thus, NCP p , CsqP p , CsetP p , Tree, and Grph ca are categorically equivalent.
25 There is also another sense in which Corollary 4.3(b) accords with the SE equivalence. The forward half of the corollary is Theorem 4.2, and that theorem transforms choice-sequence nodes to choice-set nodes via the bijection R|T . That same bijection is used in SE Theorem 3.1.
NCF
←→ .
C3.3(b)
C3.5(b)
C3.8(b)
C3.7(b)
CsqFã ←→ .
C4.5(b)
CsqF p ←→ .
CsetF p 
Further Remarks
Deducing consequences from an isomorphic enclosure
Consider this paper's first isomorphic enclosure. Theorem 3.2 shows that each NCF form Φ is isomorphic to a CsqF formΦ by means of an isomorphism which transforms nodes via the bijectionτ . Proposition 2.6 deduces many consequences from such an isomorphism. For example, its part (o) implies that (∀t
, where T is the node set of Φ, ≺ is derived from Φ, and≺ is derived fromΦ. Although such consequences about form derivatives like ≺ and ≺ are tantalizingly natural, the consequences about form derivatives in Proposition 2.6(f)-(r) take about 10 pages to prove. That work is important because such consequences are fundamental to drawing more conclusions from the isomorphic enclosure of NCF in CsqF.
As Section 3.2 explained, the isomorphic enclosure of NCF in CsqF is analogous to KL16 Theorem 1. No consequences about form derivatives have been deduced from that ad hoc theorem, and an analog of Proposition 2.6(f)-(r) would likely require about 10 pages to prove. Moreover, like KL16 Theorem 1, no consequences about form derivatives have been deduced from KL16 Theorem 2 or from SE Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. Each of these ad hoc theorems has its own formulation, so deriving analogs of Proposition 2.6(f)-(r) for the three of them would likely require another 3×10 = 30 pages.
In contrast, Proposition 2.6(f)-(r) applies not only to the isomorphic enclosure of NCF in CsqF. It applies to any isomorphic enclosure. Thus it applies to all the arrows in Figure 4 .2, as well as to all isomorphic enclosures in the future.
Future research
As discussed in Section 1.2, this paper is part of a larger agenda to translate game theory across specification styles. In this larger context, isomorphic enclosures can be seen as a way to translate form components from one style to another, and on the basis of these isomorphic enclosures, Proposition 2.6(f)-(r) (discussed just above) can be seen as a way of translating form derivatives from one style to another. The
Further Remarks
results of this paper wait to be expanded in three orthogonal directions. [1] There is more to translate beyond forms and their derivatives. This would include properties that forms might satisfy, and theorems that might relate these properties to one another. (This paper makes some limited progress in this direction by exploring the isomorphically invariant properties of no-absentmindedness and perfect-information, and by identifying some special properties of CsqF forms and CsetF forms via Propositions 3.1 and 4.1.) Expanding in this direction would correspond to expanding the three substantive sections of this paper.
[2] This paper concerns only three styles: NCF, CsqF, and CsetF. There are other styles to explore, including the two neglected styles mentioned at the start of this paper, namely, the "node-set" style of Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016 Section 6.3, and the "outcome-set" style of von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944 and Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016 Section 6.2. Expanding in this direction will require defining new NCF subcategories for "node-set" forms and "outcome-set" forms, and will correspond to adding, to the present paper, two new sections for the two new subcategories.
[3] This paper concerns only forms, which need to be augmented with preferences in order to define games. At the higher level of games, many more issues emerge. To return to [1] , there is more to translate, including equilibrium concepts and the theorems which might relate one equilibrium concept to another. To return to [2] , there will be more than five styles because there are alternative ways to specify preferences over the same form. Expanding in this third direction will require building a new category for games that incorporates this paper's category for forms. Appendix A. NCF Lemma A.1. Suppose (T, C, ⊗) is an NCP preform with its F , t o , p, q, and H. Then the following hold.
Proof. (a) . In the paragraph after SP equation (1), remark [ii] shows that (/ ∃t∈T ) p(t) = t. Thus, since p is nonempty by [T1], there are distinct t 1 ∈ T and t 2 ∈ T such that t [b] implies t ∈ F −1 (c), which implies c ∈ F (t). This and [c] imply c ∈ F (H). H) . [b] and the forward direction of part (b) imply [c] F −1 (q(t )) = H. Meanwhile, [a] and SP Proposition 3.1(b) imply p(t )⊗q(t ) = t . This and [P1] imply (p(t ), q(t )) ∈ F gr . This implies p(t ) ∈ F −1 (q(t )), which equals H by [c] .
(c). (Forward direction). Suppose
[a] and SP Proposition 3.1(b) imply p(t )⊗q(t ) = t . This and [P1] imply (p(t ), q(t )) ∈ F gr . This implies q(t ) ∈ F (p(t )). This and [b] imply q(t ) ∈ F (H). 2
Lemma A.2.
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Suppose α = [Π, Π , τ, δ] is a preform morphism, where Π = (T, C, ⊗) determines F and where
Proof. (a) . Take c. I argue 
The third equality holds by SP Proposition 3.8(c). The fifth holds because τ is a bijection by SP Theorem 3.7 (second sentence). The remaining equalities are rearrangements. 2
Proof A.3 (for Proposition 2.1). (a). First I show [1]
∪ i∈I X i = X by arguing, in steps, that ∪ i∈I X i by the definition of (X i ) i∈I equals ∪ i∈I (∪ c∈Ci F −1 (c)); which by rearrangement equals ∪ c∈∪ i∈I Ci F −1 (c) ; which by the definition of C equals ∪ c∈C F −1 (c) ; which by definition equals F −1 (C); which by definition (in Section 2.1) equals X. Thus it remains to show that (∀i∈I, j∈I {i}) X i ∩X j = ∅. Toward that end, suppose there are i 1 ∈ I and i 2 ∈ I such that [2] (e) .
Henceforth assume that [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] is a morphism. The remaining two paragraphs of the proposition follow from Claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 below.
which by definition is X ι(i) .
Claim 2: (m) holds. Take i and H ∈ H i . By the definition of H i , there exists
)). [1] and [FM3] imply δ(c) ∈ C ι(i) . Thus the definition of H ι(i) implies (F ) −1 (δ(c)) ∈ H ι(i) . This and [3] imply H ∈ H ι(i) . Thus it remains to show that τ (H) ⊆ H . I argue, in steps, that τ (H) by [2] equals τ (F −1 (c)), which by Lemma A.2(a) is included in (F )
−1 (δ(c)), which by [3] equals H . (b) , note that (a) and SP Theorem 3.9 imply that F 1 ([Π, Π , τ, δ]) is a Tree morphism. By that theorem's definition of F,
Claim 4: (f), (h), (i), (j), and (l) hold. Because of Claim 3(a), these parts follow from various results in SP. In particular, (f) follows from SP Lemma C.6(18a). (h) follows from SP Lemma C.9(20a). (i) follows from SP Lemma C.9(20b). (j) follows from SP Proposition 3.4(22a) since Section 2.1 defines X equal to F −1 (C) and thus X equal to (F ) −1 (C ). (l) follows from SP Proposition 3.5.
Claim 5: (g) and (n)-(r) hold. Because of Claim 3(b), these parts of the proposition follow from various parts of SP Proposition 2.4. In particular, (g) follows from SP Proposition 2.
4(a). (n)-(p) follow from SP Proposition 2.4(c)-(e). (q) follows from SP Proposition 2.4(h). (r) follows from SP Proposition 2.4(g). 2
Proof A.5 (for Theorem 2.3). The next two paragraphs draw upon SP Theorem 3.6, which showed that NCP is a well-defined category.
This paragraph shows that, for each form Φ, id Φ is a form morphism. Toward this end, take a form 
This paragraph shows that, for any two form morphisms β and β , β 
, where the first inclusion holds because δ(C i ) ⊆ C ι(i) by [FM3] for β, applied at i, and where the second inclusion holds by [FM3] for β , applied at i = ι(i).
The previous two paragraphs have established the well-definition of identity and composition. The unit and associative laws are immediate. Thus NCF is a category (e.g. Mac Lane 1998, page 10).
2 Lemma A.6. Suppose [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] is a morphism, where Φ = (I, T, (C i ) i∈I , ⊗) and Φ = (I , T , (C i ) i ∈I , ⊗ ). Further suppose that ι and δ are bijections. Then the following hold.
Proof. Define C = ∪ i∈I C i and C = ∪ i ∈I C i . The lemma follows from Claims 3 and 4.
, which implies δ is a function from C to C . Thus the definitions of C and C imply δ is a function from ∪ i∈I C i to ∪ i ∈I C i . δ is a bijection by assumption.
Thus it remains to show that C ι(i) δ(C i ) = ∅. Toward that end, suppose contrariwise there is c such that [a] c ∈ C ι(i) and [b] c / ∈ δ(C i ). [a] and Claim 1 implies that δ −1 (c ) is a well-defined element of ∪ k∈I C k . Thus there is j ∈ I such that δ −1 (c ) ∈ C j . This implies [c] c ∈ δ(C j ). [c] and [b] [c] and [FM3] imply c ∈ C ι(j) . This and [a] imply [e] Claim 3: (a) holds. This follows from the bijectivity of δ and Claim 2.
Claim 4: (b) holds. Since ι is bijective, it suffices to prove that (∀i∈I)
is a bijection from C ι(i) onto C i . By Claim 2, this is equivalent to proving that
This follows from part (a). 2
Proof A.7 (for Theorem 2.4). Let the components of Φ be (I, T,
The forward half of (a) and all of (b) . Suppose that β is an isomorphism (Awodey 2010, page 12, Definition 1.3) . Recall that β = [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] and let
where the first equality in both lines holds by the definition of β −1 , and the second equality in both lines holds by the definition of id. The well definition of • in [1] implies [a] Φ * = Φ . Analogously, the well definition of • in [2] implies [b] Φ * * = Φ. The third component of [1] implies ι * •ι = id I , and the third component of [2] implies ι•ι * = id I . Thus ι is a bijection from I onto I and [c] ι * = ι −1 . Similarly, the fourth components of [1] and [2] imply τ is a bijection from T onto T and [d] τ * = τ −1 . Similarly again, the fifth components of [1] and [2] imply δ is a bijection from C onto C and [e] δ * = δ −1 . To conclude, the previous three sentences have shown that ι, τ , and δ are bijections. Further,
where the first equality follows from the definition of β −1 , and where the second equality follows from [a] - [e] .
The reverse half of (a) . Suppose that ι, τ , and δ are bijections. Define
. Derive Π from Φ and Π from Φ . The remainder of this paragraph will show that β * is a form morphism by showing that it satisfies
[FM2 ] ι −1 :I →I, and Lemma A.6 . The lemma's assumptions are met because the theorem assumes that β = [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] is a morphism and because the start of this paragraph assumes that ι and δ are bijections. Thus the lemma's part (b) 
* is a form morphism by the previous paragraph. Further,
Hence β is an isomorphism (and incidentally,
Proof. Derive F from Π, and
Proof A.9 (for Proposition 2.6). The proposition follows from Claims 1-4 and 6-7.
Claim 1: (a)- (c) hold. The forward direction of Theorem 2.4(a) implies that ι, τ , and δ are bijections.
Claim 2: (d) holds. This follows from Lemma A.6(a).
Claim 3: (k) holds. Take i. Since τ is a bijection by Claim 1 (part (b) ), it suffices to argue that
The first equality holds by the definition of X i and a rearrangement. The second equality follows from Lemma A.2(b) because [Π, Π , τ, δ] is an isomorphism by Corollary 2.5. The third equality holds by Claim 2 (part (d)). The fourth equality holds by the definition of X ι(i) .
Claim 4: (m) holds. Take i. Since [Π, Π , τ, δ] is an isomorphism by Corollary 2.5, Lemma A.8 implies that τ | Hi is a well-defined function from H i into H ι(i) . It is injective because τ is injective by Claim 1 (part (b) ). To show that it is surjective, take
is an isomorphism by Corollary 2.5. Thus Lemma A.8 can be applied to [Φ , Φ, τ
Claim 5: (a) . [Π, Π , τ, δ] is an NCP isomorphism, where Π = (T, C, ⊗) and
Tree isomorphism. (a) holds by Corollary 2.5. For (b) , note that (a) and SP Theorem 3.9 imply
Claim 6: (e), (f), (i), (j), and (l) hold. These hold by Claim 5(a) and the parts of SP Proposition 3.8. In particular, (e) holds by SP Proposition 3.8 (b) . 
7(c). (h) holds by SP Proposition 2.7(e). (n) holds by SP Proposition 2.7(d). (o)-(r) hold by SP Proposition 2.7(f)-(i). 2
Proof A.10 (for Theorem 2.7). By [F1], P 0 maps any form into a preform. By [FM1], P 1 maps any form morphism into a preform morphism. Thus it suffices to show that P preserves source, target, identity, and composition (Mac Lane 1998 page 13). This is done in the following four claims.
src by the definition of β is equal to
src , which by the definition of src in NCP is equal to P 0 (Φ), which by the definition of src in NCF is equal to P 0 ([Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] src ), which by the definition of β is equal to P 0 (β src ).
Claim 2: P 1 (β) trg = P 0 (β trg ). This is very similar to Claim 1. Simply change src to trg.
Claim 3: P 1 (id Φ ) = id P0(Φ) . Take Φ = (I, T, (C i ) i∈I , ⊗) and let C = ∪ i C i . First I show [a] P 0 (Φ) = (T, C, ⊗) by arguing, in steps, that P 0 (Φ) by the definition of Φ is P 0 (I, T, (C i ) i∈I , ⊗), which by the definition of P 0 is (T, ∪ i∈I C i , ⊗), which by the definition of C is (T, C, ⊗). Then I argue, in steps, that P 1 (id Φ ) by the definition of id in NCF is equal to P 1 ([Φ, Φ, id I , id T , id C ]), which by the definition of P 1 is equal to [P 0 (Φ), P 0 (Φ), id T , id C ], which by [a] is equal to [(T, C, ⊗), (T, C, ⊗), id T , id C ], which by the definition of id in NCP is equal to id (T,C,⊗) , which by [a] is equal to id P0(Φ) .
. First I note that, since P 1 is well-defined by the first paragraph,
are preform morphisms. Then I argue that
where the first equality holds by the definitions of β and β , the second by the definition of • in NCF, the third by the definition of P 1 , the fourth by the previous sentence and by the definition of • in NCP, the fifth by the definition of P 1 , and the sixth by the definitions of β and β . 2 (a). Suppose Π and Π are isomorphic. Then (a fortiori) there is a morphism to Π from Π and also a morphism from Π to Π . By part (a o ) and the first morphism, the no-absentmindedness of Π implies the no-absentmindedness of Π . Similarly, by part (a o ) and the second morphism, the no-absentmindedness of Π is implied by the no-absentmindedness of Π . 
Further, SP Theorem 3.7 implies that τ is a bijection from T onto T . Hence [b] implies [e] 
, [e] , and [f] imply that Π does not have perfect-information.
(a). This follows from Claim 1. (b) . This follows from part (a) and the definition of perfect-information for forms. 2
Lemma A.13. Suppose that (T, p) is a functioned tree and that τ :T →T is a bijection. Define the function p by surjectivity and
Proof. Since (T, p) is a functioned tree, there exist t o ∈ T and X ⊆ T to satisfy
p is a nonempty function from T {t o } onto X , and
These two statements are shown by Claims 6 and 8.
This follows from the bijectivity of τ and the definition of t o .
Claim 2: τ | X :X→X is a bijection. This follows from the bijectivity of τ and the definition of X . Claim 4:
The first equality holds by the lemma's definition of p gr . The second holds since the domain of p is T {t o } by [T1] . The third is a rearrangement. The fourth holds by Claim 1. The fifth and sixth are rearrangements. The last holds because the domain of (τ Figure A. 1 commutes. This follows from Claim 4 because [a] p is surjective by assumption and [b] 
is surjective by Claim 3.
Claim 6: [T1 ] holds. This follows from Claims 3 and 5.
On the one hand, suppose m = 1. Then the claim holds by the definition of m. On the other hand, suppose m ≥ 2. Then proving the claim requires several steps. First, I show
Take any such n. Since τ is bijective, it suffices to show that the composition 
This holds because the right-hand side of (b) is a rearrangement of the right-hand side of (a) . Third, I argue
where the first equality holds by (b) at n=m−1, the second by (b) at n=m−2, ..., and the last by (b) at n=1. Finally, I argue the claim holds because
where the first equality holds by the definition of m, the second is a rearrangement, and the third holds by (c) .
Thus by Claim 7, there exists m ≥ 1 such that
I now argue
The first equation holds by the definition of t o and the fact that t o ∈ X in any functioned tree (by remark [iv] in the paragraph following SP equation (1)). The second equation holds by the definition of m, the third is a rearrangement, and the fourth holds by Claim 5. 2
Lemma A.14. Suppose Π = (T, C, ⊗) is an NCP preform. Also suppose τ :T →T and δ:C→C are bijections. Define ⊗ by surjectivity and
This is done by Claims 6, 7, and 9.
Claim 1: (τ, δ)| F gr :F gr →F gr is a bijection. This follows from the bijectivity of τ , the bijectivity of δ, and the definition of F .
The claim follows from composition. In particular, ((τ, δ)| F gr ) −1 :F gr →F gr is a bijection by Claim 1, ⊗:F gr →T {t o } is a bijection by the definitions of F and t o , and Claim 4:
The first equality holds by the lemma's definition of ⊗ . The second holds by the definition of F , and the third by the definition of t o . The fourth holds by Claim 1. The fifth and sixth are rearrangements. The seventh holds by Claim 1. Figure A. 2 commutes. This follows from Claim 4 because [a] ⊗ is surjective by definition and [b] τ | T {t o } is surjective by Claim 2. [P2] implies that [a] (T, p) is a functioned tree. Define p by [P2 ]. Claim 6 and SP Lemma C.1(a) implies [b] p is well-defined and [c] p is surjective. Because of [b] , it suffices to show that (T , p ) is a functioned tree.
Toward that end, consider Lemma A.13. Lemma A.13's assumptions are met by [a] and the injectivity of τ . Thus Lemma A.13 implies that (T , p ) is a functioned tree, where the function p is defined by [d] p being surjective and [e] p gr = { (τ (t ), τ (t)) | (t , t)∈p gr }. Thus it suffices to show that p = p .
Toward that end, note [c] and [d] imply that both p and p are surjective. Thus it suffices to show p gr = p gr . I argue
The first equality holds by the definition of p two paragraphs ago, and the second equality holds by the definition of ⊗ in the lemma statement. The ⊆ direction of the third equality holds simply because the variable c does not appear in the right-hand side. The ⊇ direction follows from ⊗ gr ⊆ T ×C×T and δ:C→C . The fourth equality holds because the codomain of τ is T . The fifth equality follows from the definition of p two paragraphs ago, and the sixth equality follows from [e] .
by definition is {t ∈T |c ∈F (t )}, which by rearrangement is {t ∈T |(t , c )∈F gr }, which, by the definition of F , the bijectivity of τ , and the bijectivity of δ, is {t ∈T |(τ
Claim 9: [P3 ] holds. It must be shown that [a] (∀c ∈C ) (F )
To show [a] , take c . By the bijectivity of δ, δ
To show [b] , suppose that [b] Finally, SP Theorem 3.7 implies that [Π, Π , τ, δ] is an isomorphism because [a] it is a morphism by the previous paragraph and [b] τ and δ are bijective by assumption.
2 Lemma A.15. Suppose Φ = (I, T, (C i ) i∈I , ⊗) is an NCF form. Also suppose ι:I→I , τ :T →T , and δ:∪ i∈I C i →C are bijections. Define ⊗ by surjectivity and
Proof. Define C = ∪ i∈I C i . Define Π = (T, C, ⊗). Define Π = (T , C , ⊗ ).
Claim 1: (a) Π is an NCP preform and (b) [Π, Π , τ, δ] is an NCP isomorphism. Consider Lemma A.14. The assumptions of Lemma A.14 are met because
T →T is a bijection by assumption, and [iii] δ:C→C is a bijection because C = ∪ i∈I C i by definition and δ:∪ i∈I C i →C is a bijection by assumption. Further, Lemma A.14's definitions of ⊗ and Π coincide with the present definitions of ⊗ and Π . Thus Lemma A.14 implies this claim's two conclusions.
Claim 2: C = ∪ i ∈I C i . I argue, in four steps, that C by the bijectivity of δ equals δ(∪ i∈I C i ), which by rearrangement equals ∪ i∈I δ(C i ), which by the bijectivity of ι equals ∪ i ∈I δ(C ι −1 (i ) ), which by the definition of (C i ) i ∈I equals ∪ i ∈I C i .
Claim 3: Φ satisfies [F1] . It must be shown that (T , C , ⊗ ) is a preform where C is defined as ∪ i ∈I C i . Claim 2 implies that C = C . Hence Π = (T , C , ⊗ ). Hence Claim 1 (a) implies that (T , C , ⊗ ) is a preform.
Claim 4: Φ satisfies [F2]. Take i ∈ I and j ∈ I {i }. The bijectivity of ι implies ι −1 (i ) ∈ I and ι −1 (j )
Claim 5: Φ satisfies [F3]. Take t ∈ T . The bijectivity of τ implies τ −1 (t ) ∈ T . Hence [F3] for Φ implies there is i ∈ I such that F (τ −1 (t )) ⊆ C i . Hence the bijectivity of ι implies there is i ∈ I such that [a] 
) by arguing, in steps, that F (τ −1 (t )) by rearrangement equals {c∈C|(τ −1 (t ), c)∈F gr }, which by Claim 1 (b) and SP Proposition 3.8(c) equals {c∈C|(t , δ(c))∈F gr }, which by the bijectivity of δ equals {c|(∃c ∈C ) c=δ −1 (c ), (t , δ(c))∈F gr }, which by rearrangement equals {δ −1 (c )|(∃c ∈C ) (t , c )∈F gr }, which by rearrangement equals δ −1 ({c ∈C |(t , c )∈F gr }), which by rearrangement equals δ −1 (F (t )). [a] and [b] 
Claim 6: Φ is an NCF form. This follows from Claims 3-5.
Claim 7: [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] is an NCF morphism. Φ is an NCF form by assumption, and Φ is an NCF form by Claim 6. [FM1] holds because [Π, Π , τ, δ] is an NCP morphism a fortiori by Claim 1 (b) . [FM2] holds by assumption. For [FM3], take i ∈ I. I argue, in two steps, that δ(C i ) by the bijectivity of ι equals δ(C ι −1 •ι(i) ), which by definition of C ι(i) equals C ι(i) .
Claim 8: [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] is an NCF isomorphism. This follows from the reverse direction of Corollary 2.5 because [a] [Φ, Φ , ι, τ, δ] is an NCF morphism by Claim 7, [b] [Π, Π , τ, δ] is an NCP isomorphism by Claim 1 (b) , and [c] ι is a bijection by assumption.
Conclusion. The lemma's conclusions follow from Claims 6 and 8. Claim 1: (a) holds. Suppose [a] t o = {}.
[Csq1] states [b] {} ∈ T . [a] and [b] imply {} ∈ T {t o }. Thus by [P1] , there are t ∈ T and c ∈ C such that (t, c, {}) ∈ ⊗ gr . Thus by [Csq2] , p({})⊕(c) = {}. This is impossible because the left-hand sequence has positive length and the right-hand sequence has zero length.
Claim 2: (b) holds. Take t ∈ T {{}}. Claim 1 (a) implies t ∈ T {t o }. Thus the reverse direction of SP Proposition 3.1(a) implies (p(t ), q(t ), t ) ∈ ⊗. Thus [Csq2] implies p(t )⊕(q(t )) = t . Thus p(t ) = 1 t |t |−1 and q(t ) = t |t | . 
gr . [2] and Claim 3 (c) imply t⊕(c) = t . This and [1] imply t⊕(c) ∈ T . Conversely, suppose t⊕(c) ∈ T . There there is t ∈ T such that t⊕(c) = t . Thus Claim 3 (c) implies (t, c, t ) ∈ ⊗ gr . This and [P1] imply (t, c) ∈ F gr .
Claim 5: (e) holds. Take t ∈ T . I will use induction on m ∈ {0, 1, ... |t|}. For the initial step, assume m = 0. Then p 0 (t) = t = 1 t |t| = 1 t |t|−0 = 1 t |t|−m by inspection. For the inductive step, assume m > 0. Note m ≤ |t| implies |t|−m ≥ 0, which implies |t|−(m−1) > 0, which implies [1] 1 t |t|−(m−1) = {}. I then argue, in steps, that p m (t) by m > 0 equals p(p m−1 (t)), which by the inductive hypothesis equals p( 1 t |t|−(m−1) ), which by [1] and Claim 2 (b) at t = 1 t |t|−(m−1) equals 1 t |t|−(m−1)−1 , which by rearrangement equals 1 t |t|−m .
Claim 6: (f) holds. Take t ∈ T . I show p |t| (t) = t 0 by arguing, in steps, that p |t| (t) by Claim 5 (e) at m = |t| equals 1 t |t|−|t| , which equals 1 t 0 , which equals {}, which by Claim 1 (a) equals t o . This and the definition of k imply k(t) = |t|.
Claim 7: (g) holds. Take t ∈ T . By inspection, the result is equivalent to (∀ ∈{1, 2, ... |t|}) t = q•p |t|− (t). On the one hand, take t = {}. Then |t| = 0 so the result is vacuously true. On the other hand, take t = {}. 
27 In the proof of Claim 7719o, change < to ≤, and ⊂ to ⊆. 
=1 ∈T is a well-defined bijection. Its inverse is
Proof. Let α be the function from T toT , and conversely, let β be the function to T fromT .
This paragraph shows that β•α is the identity function on T . The composition is well-defined because [1] the domain of β isT and [2] the range of α isT by the 27 Claim 10 says that one sequence is an initial segment of another sequence iff the former is a restriction of the latter. This may appear implausible. For example, {(2, f)} is not an initial sequence of t * = {(1, g), (2, f), (3, f)} even though {(2, f)} is a restriction of t * . This is consistent with Claim 10, because {(2, f)} is not a sequence and thus not an element of T by [Csq1]. definition ofT . Thus it suffices to show (∀t∈T ) β•α(t) = t. Toward that end, take t ∈ T . First, suppose k(t) = 0. I argue, in steps, that β•α(t) by the definition of α equals β({}), which by the definition of β equals t o , which by k(t) = 0 equals t. Second, suppose k(t) = 1. I argue, in steps, that β•α(t) by the definition of α equals β[(q(t))], which by the definition of β equals t o ⊗q(t), which by k(t) = 1 equals p(t)⊗q(t), which by SP Proposition 3.1(b) equals t. Third and finally, suppose k(t) ≥ 2. I will argue
The first equality holds by the definition of α, the second by the definition of β, and the third by the definition of k. The fourth and fifth equalities hold by a rearrangement and SP Proposition 3.1 (b) . The sixth equality holds by k(t)−2 similar applications of SP Proposition 3.1 (b) , and the final equality holds by a final application of SP Proposition 3.1 (b) . This paragraph shows that α•β is the identity function onT . The composition is well-defined because [a] the domain of α is T and [b] each value of β is a value of ⊗ and the codomain of ⊗ is a subset of T . Thus it suffices to show (∀t∈T ) α•β(t) =t. Toward that end, taket. First, supposet = {}. I argue, in steps, that α•β({}) by the definition of β equals α(t o ), which by the definition of α equals {}. Second, supposet = {}. Then it suffices to show that (∀t∈T ) (∀ ∈{1, 2, ...|t|}) (α•β(t)) = t . Toward this end, taket and .
[i] First assume < |t|. I will argue
The first equality holds by the definition of α. The second equality holds because k(β(t)) = |t| by inspecting the definitions of k and β. The third holds by the definition of β. The fourth holds by the definition of p. The fifth holds by |t|− −1 similar applications of the definition of p. The sixth is a rearrangement. The seventh holds by the definition of q.
[ii] Second assume = |t|. Then I will argue
The first equality holds by the definition of α and = |t|. The second equality holds because k(β(t)) = |t| by inspecting the definitions of k and β. The third is trivial. The fourth holds by the definitions of q and β. 2 Proof B.3 (for Theorem 3.2). (a). Lemma B.2 impliesτ :T →T is a bijection. Thus the assumptions of Lemma A.14 are met at T =T , C = C, and δ = id C . Further, the definition of⊗ here coincides with the definition of ⊗ in Lemma A.14. Therefore Lemma A.14 implies that (T, C,⊗) is an NCP preform, and that [(T, C, ⊗), (T, C,⊗),τ, 
Then by the definition of⊗, there are t ∈ T and t ∈ T such that [a] τ (t) =t, [b] τ (t ) =t , and [c] (t, c, t ) ∈ ⊗ gr . [a] , [b] , and the
. Also [c] and SP Proposition 3.1 (b) 
which by rearrangement equals (q•p k(t )− (t ))
⊕(q(t )), which by rearrange- Claim 3: Not (c) ⇒ not (d). Assume not (c) . There there are t ∈ T and H ∈ H such that |{ :1≤ ≤|t|, t ∈F (H)}| ≥ 2. Hence there are and such that [a] < , [b] t ∈ F (H), and [c] t ∈ F (H). I argue in three steps that [c] by Proposition 3.1(b) implies q( 1 t ) ∈ F (H), which by Proposition A.1(c) implies p( 1 t ) ∈ H, which by Proposition 3.1 (b) [a] implies t * is well-defined and equal to t . Thus t * = t * . This and [a] again imply |R(t * )| < |t * |.
There there is t ∈ T such that |R(t)| = |t|. Since |R(t)| > |t| is inconceivable, |R(t)| < |t|. Thus there are and in {1, 2, ... |t|} such that [a] < and [b] [c] , [e] , and [g] imply absentmindedness.
Claim 5: (a) , (b) , (c) , and (d) are equivalent. This follows from Claims 1-4.
Claim 6: Not (d) ⇒ not (e). Assume not (d). Then there is t ∈ T such that |R(t)| = |t|. Thus since |R(t)| > |t| is inconceivable, |R(t)| < |t|. Thus there are and in {1, 2, ... |t|} such that [a] < and [b] t = t . [a] and [b] imply R( 1 t −1 ) = R( 1 t ). Thus R| T is not injective.
Claim 7: Not (e) ⇒ not (d). Assume not (e) . Then R| T is not injective. Then there are s and t in T such that [a] 
On the one hand, suppose there is not an in {1, 2, ... min{|s|, |t|}} such that s = t . Then [c] 1 s max{|s|,|t|} = 1 t max{|s|,|t|} . Thus [a] implies |s| = |t|. Hence |s| < |t| or |t| < |s|. Without loss of generality assume [d] |s| < |t|. Hence [c] implies [e] Appendix C. CsetF Lemma C.1. Suppose C is a set, t ⊆ C, c ∈ C, and t ⊆ C. Then the following are equivalent. (a) c / ∈ t and t∪{c} = t . (b) t = t and t∪{c} = t . (c) t = t and t = t {c}. (d) t ⊆ t and {c} = t t.
Proof. (a)⇔ (b) . It suffices to show that if t∪{c} = t , then c / ∈ t and t = t are equivalent. Toward that end, assume t∪{c} = t . Then both directions of the equivalence hold by inspection.
(b)⇔ (c) . It suffices to show that if t = t , then t∪{c} = t and t = t {c} are equivalent. Toward that end, assume [1] [b] implies (t∪{c}) t = t t, and [a] implies that the left-hand side is {c}. Conversely, assume (d). That is, assume [c] Claims 1, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18 , and 19.
Claim 1: (a) holds. Suppose [a] t o = {}.
[Cset1] states [b] {} ∈ T . [a] and [b] imply {} ∈ T {t o }. Thus by [P1], there is t ∈ T and c ∈ C such that (t, c, {}) ∈ ⊗ gr . Thus by [Cset2] , t∪{c} = {}. This implies c ∈ {}, which is impossible.
Claim 2: ⊗ ⊆ { (t, c, t )∈T ×C×T | c / ∈t, t∪{c}=t }. Take (t, c, t ) ∈ ⊗ gr .
[P1] yields [a] (t, c, t ) ∈ T ×C×T . [P2] yields [b] t = p(t ). Remark [ii] in the paragraph following SP equation (1) yields [c] p(t ) = t . [b] and [c] Claim 3: (b) holds. Take t ∈ T {{}}. Claim 1 (a) implies that t ∈ T {t o }. Thus SP Proposition 3.1 (a) implies that (p(t ), q(t ), t ) ∈ ⊗. Thus Claim 2 implies that q(t ) / ∈ p(t ) and p(t )∪{q(t )} = t .
Claim 4: (∀t∈T, ∀m∈{0, 1, 2, ... k(t)}) |p m (t)| = |t| − m. Note by inspection, that Claim 3 (b) implies [a] (∀t ∈T {{}}) |p(t )| = |t |−1. To prove the present claim, take t ∈ T . I will show (∀m∈{0, 1, 2, ... k(t)}) |p m (t)| = |t| − m by induction. For the initial step (m=0), |p 0 (t)| = |t| = |t|−0 = |t|−m by inspection. For the inductive step (m≥1), I first note that by assumption m ≤ k(t), which trivially implies m−1 < k(t), which by the definition of k implies p m−1 (t) = t o , which by Claim 1 (a) implies [b] p m−1 (t) = {}. I then argue, in steps, that |p m (t)| by rearrangement equals |p•p m−1 (t)|, which by [b] and [a] at t = p m−1 (t) equals |p m−1 (t)| − 1, which by the inductive hypothesis equals (|t|−(m−1)) − 1, which by rearrangement equals |t| − m.
Claim 5: (c) holds. Take t ∈ T . Note [a] |p k(t) (t)| = |t| − k(t) by Claim 4 at m = k(t). Also note [b] |p k(t) (t)| = |t o | = |{}| = 0 by the definition of k(t) and by Claim 1 (a) . [a] and [b] imply |t| − k(t) = 0. Hence |t| = k(t).
Claim 6: (d) holds. Take t ∈ T . I will use induction on m ∈ {0, 1, ... |t|}. For the initial step (m=0), p m (t) = p 0 (t) = t and t p m (t) = t p 0 (t) = t t = {} = { q•p n (t) | 0>n≥0 } = { q•p n (t) | m>n≥0 }. For the inductive step (m≥1), note m ≤ |t| by assumption; which implies m−1 < |t|; which implies m−1 < k(t) by Claim 5 (c); which implies p m−1 (t) = t o by the definition of k; which implies p m−1 (t) = {} by Claim 1 (a) . Hence, Claim 3 (b) at t = p m−1 (t) implies q•p m−1 (t) / ∈ p•p m−1 (t) and p•p m−1 (t)∪{q•p m−1 (t)} = p m−1 (t). By Lemma C.1(a)⇔(d), this is equivalent to p•p m−1 (t) ⊆ p m−1 (t) and p m−1 (t) p•p m−1 (t) = {q•p m−1 (t)}. By a small rearrangement, this is equivalent to [c] Claim 9: (e) holds. Take t ∈ T . I argue, in steps, that t trivially equals t {}, which by Claim 1 (a) equals t t o , which by the definition of k equals t p k(t) (t), which by Claim 5 (c) equals t p |t| (t), which by Claim 6 (d) at m = |t| equals { q•p n (t) | |t|>n≥0 } Claim 10: (f) holds. Forward direction. Take c ∈ C. By [P3], F −1 (c) is a member of a partition, and thus, it is nonempty. Take t * ∈ F −1 (c) . By [P1], t * ⊗c ∈ T . Thus by [Cset2] , t * ∪{c} ∈ T . Thus c belongs to an element of T . Reverse direction. Take any t.
[Cset1] implies that t is a set. Take b ∈ t. By Claim 9 (e), there is n such that b = q•p n (t). Thus, since the codomain of q is C, b ∈ C. Claim 12: (h) holds. Suppose |t∩F (H)| ≥ 2. Then by Claim 9 (e), there exist distinct m and m such that { q•p m (t), q•p m (t) } ⊆ F (H). Thus by Lemma A.1(c) , [a] { p m +1 (t), p m+1 (t) } ⊆ H. Without loss of generality assume m > m. Then p m +1 (t) = p m −m •p m+1 (t). Hence [b] p m +1 (t) ≺ p m+1 (t) by the definition of ≺. [a] and [b] show there is absentmindedness, which contradicts Claim 11 (g). Claim 17: (∀t∈T, c∈C, t ∈T ) (c / ∈ t and t∪{c} = t ) ⇒ (t, c) = (p(t ), q(t )). Suppose [a] c / ∈ t and [b] t∪{c} = t . [a] and [b] imply [c] Claim 18: (l) holds. By Claim 2, it suffices to show the reverse direction. Toward that end, suppose [a] c / ∈ t and [b] t∪{c} = t . [b] implies t = {}. Thus Claim 1 (a) implies t = t o . Thus SP Proposition 3.1(a) implies [c] p(t )⊗q(t ) = t . Also, [a] , [b] , and Claim 17 imply [d] (t, c) = (p(t ), q(t )). [c] and [d] imply t⊗c = t .
